A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Convoy-ASW Problem by Kiland, Ingolf Norman Jr. & Kotchka, Jerry Allen
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1967
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Convoy-ASW Problem
Kiland, Ingolf Norman
Monterey, California. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/12245
A ®AM£ THEORETIC ANALYSIS C#WE CONYO^ASW PROBLEM










A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONVOY-ASW PROBLEM
by
Ingolf Norman Kiland, Jr.
Lieutenant, Unitetf States Navy
B.S., Naval Academy , 19 59
and
Jerry Allen Kotchka
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Naval Academy, 1962
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





The problem of allocation of ASW forces assigned to an
oceanic convoy in a submarine warfare environment is postu-
lated as a two-person game with the payoff function being
based on the "formula of random search". The opponents in
the game are a convoy system and a submarine system. A
submarine is given the option of attacking the convoy system
either from afar with surface-launched missiles or near with
torpedoes. The convoy system is defended by units capable
of destroying submarines exercising either of their options.
The optimal allocation of forces for both sides is shown to
be a set of pure strategies which are dependent on the
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I . INTRODUCTION
GENERAL , The oceanic crossing of a convoy system in a sub-
marine warfare environment is a problem of major concern to
the U~ S. Navy, As in all warfare the lines of communication
must be maintained open to insure the support of the front
lines of defense. In present day warfare a primary means of
accomplishing this goal is by large oceanic convoys. An
enemy would desire to make this task impossible or at least
severely limit its success. In a non-nuclear conflict an
enemy would probably send submarines against the convoy/
since they are less susceptible to detection and attack than
either aircraft or surface ships. The convoy would have to
protect itself with anti-submarine warfare vehicles if it
expects to succeed in its mission.
Since the results of a given convoy crossing will depend
on the course of action taken by each force, modeling the
defense of a convoy as a two-person game is intuitively
appealing. In previous studies the convoy problem has been
analytically treated by various deterministic or probabilis-
tic mathematical techniques by Boice [1], Cooper [2], and
others. However, these approaches were founded on the as-
sumption that the opposition has some well defined tactic.
The game theoretic approach does not require this assumption
but more realistically considers that the submarine system
also has an allocation problem,
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM . Throughout this paper we will
refer to the convoy system and the submarine system which
oppose each other as Blue and Red forces respectively. The
convoy system is assumed to consist of Blue logistic units
and attacking units. The role of the Blue logistic units is
to transport men and equipment that are necessary for con-
ducting a foreign campaign across an ocean. The Blue attack-
ing units are to defend the logistic units. The submarines 1
primary role is the destruction of the convoy logistic units
before they reach their destination.
Once contact with a convoy has been made, there are two
methods of attack open to the Red forces. The most accurate
means of delivery of a weapon is for a submarine to penetrate
the convoy's screen and make a close-in torpedo attack. By
standing off outside torpedo range a submarine may be able
to use surface-launched missiles which are more destructive
weapons than torpedoes. In our analysis a submarine will be
allowed the option of attacking the convoy system either
from afar with surfaced-launched missiles or near with
torpedoes
.
Since a submarine cannot attack until he is at least
within missile range we will assume that all Red forces will
be located somewhere within missile range of the convoy's
path.
During both torpedo and missile attacks, a submarine's
susceptibility to detection is increased considerably over
normal cruising conditions. A missile attack requires that
a submarine surface before launching the missile. For a sub-
marine to realize an optimum attack position and torpedo fire-
control solution, during a torpedo attack, he must operate
at various speeds on various courses and occasionally broach
his periscope.
Because Red may be detected before he can attack, it
seems reasonable to assume that the Blue ASW forces will have
an opportunity of attacking the Red submarine before the con-
voy absorbs the Red attack.
As the convoy proceeds on its oceanic crossing two sep-
arate areas of the total ocean will be of primary concern to
both sides. The first, called the area of interest, is the
area surrounding the path of the convoy in which any sub-
marine present can conduct a torpedo attack as the convoy
passes. Thus the area of interest is a function of Red's
effective torpedo attacking radius. The second area, called
the area of concern, consists of the total oceanic area
adjacent to the area of interest from which a submarine can
attack with a surface-launched missile. Thus the area of
concern is a function of Red's effective missile radius. It
is assumed that Blue has knowledge of, or is capable of esti-
mating the size of these areas.
Since the enemy submarines can be expected to have a
reasonable knowledge of the originating and terminal points
of the convoy, they will be able to estimate the route uti-
lized by the convoy . Thus it is seen that both sides can be
expected to know both the size and the location of both areas
throughout the convoy crossing.
Within this setting, the commanders of both forces are
faced with the problem of how "best" to allocate their re-
spective attacking units between the areas of interest and
concern. In this paper we will concentrate our attention,
during formulation, to the Blue commander 1 s problem . It will
be evident, however, that we will resolve both commanders'
problems as a consequence of the game theoretic approach to
the solution of the Blue commander's problem.
II, FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
PAYOFF FUNCTION . Since both sides are confronted with an
allocation problem between the same two areas of the ocean,
the measure of the payoff should be a function of those forces
of both sides that, are deployed in each area, Because each
player is trying to destroy his opponent's ships a logical
measure of the outcome of each player's actions is the ex-
pected losses incurred by both sides in each of the two areas.
Each player would use the payoff function to guide his
decision making. The logical reaction of each player would
be to try to maximize his opponent's losses while minimizing
his own. However, it is important to realize that the nature
of the ASW problem precludes the equivalence between maxi-
mizing an opponent's losses with minimizing one's own losses.
For example, the minimizing of Blue losses is not equivalent
to maximizing Red losses because a Blue attacking unit need
not kill, but only prevent the submarine from attacking, to
minimize Blue losses. However, to maximize Red losses, Blue
must kill the Red units.
By minimizing the convoy system's losses the Blue com-
mander realizes an immediate benefit because the final value
of the logistic units completing the convoy crossing is maxi-
mized- By maximizing Red losses the Blue force also receives
a long-run return because the Red units destroyed represent
no threat to future convoys. Similarly, if the Red commander
is seeking to maximize Blue convoy losses he is fulfilling
his mission. At the same time, if he is minimizing his own
losses then he, too, is receiving both a long-and short-run
return.
The payoff for the Blue commander's problem will be
taken as the difference between Blue's expected losses and a
weighted function of Red's expected losses. Blue selects the
weighting factor in a manner such that the latter losses are
commensurable to the former from his viewpoint. The Blue
commander's objective will be to minimize this linear com-
bination.
Thus the payoff function, D, being the difference between
Blue's expected losses and weighted Red's expected losses,
may be expressed as:
D = DB - U (DR)
,
(1)
where DB = the total expected number of Blue logistic losses
(Blue ships)
;
DR = the total expected number of Red submarine losses
(Red ships)
;
U = the weighting factor equating a unit Red loss to
a unit Blue loss (Blue ships/Red ships)
.
In practice there is a difference in worth of a submarine as
compared to a logistic vessel. For this reason a weighting
factor or utility index, U, is used for each Red submarine
loss which equates the value of one Blue logistic loss to one
Red submarine loss.
The structure of the payoff function, D, implies that a
positive value of D corresponds to a gain by Red; a negative
value of D corresponds to a gain for Blue.
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EXPECTED BLUE LOSSES . In the development of an expression
for the expected Blue losses we will assume that the Red
forces consist of submarines which have identical capabilities
and effectiveness, In addition, each Red submarine is assumed
to be able to render either torpedo or surface-launches mis-
sile attacks, but not both concurrently. Finally, since a
large convoy provides a "noisy" target, the probability of
detection of tne convoy by a Red unit can be considered to
be unity.
To prevent multiple detection of Red by Blue, and at the
same time to ensure a reasonable degree of survival, the sub-
marines are assumed to act independently of one another and
to be deployed uniformly over each of the areas.
We assume that each submarine has a limited supply of
torpedoes and missiles; consequently, to conserve his weapons
for the logistic units he does not expend his weapons on the
ASW vehicles. It is obvious that Red has no choice in the
case of ASW aircraft, but he may have a choice if Blue is
using ships as the ASW vehicles.
The Blue attacking units are assumed also to act inde-
pendently of each other, Further, we will assume that all
units will be assigned equal areas in which to conduct a
random search for Red submarines,
The independent, random search by both Red and Blue,
combined with the limitations of Blue's detection equipment
characteristics, sea and weather conditions, and operator
performance allows the use of the "formula of random search"
11
for determining the probability of detection of a Red unit
by a Blue unit. [2].
The total expected number of Blue losses, DB , may there-
fore be expressed as
:
DB = mP.C. + (M - m)P C (2)11 c c
where M = the total number of Red submarines;
m = the number of Red submarines in the area of interest;
M - m = the number of Red submarines in the area of
concern;
P. = the probability of a Red submarine in the area of
interest, A. survives an attack, by a Blue unit;
P = the probability a Red submarine in the area of
concern, A
, survives an attack by a Blue unit;
C. = the expected number of Blue logistic units de-
stroyed (i.e., effectiveness constant) by a Red
submarine deployed in the area of interest;
C = the expected number of Blue logistic units de-
stroyed by a Red submarine deployed in the area
of concern.
The terms C. and C represent effectiveness constants and are
1 c v
functions of the performance of a submarine. They are depend-
ent on the number of Blue logistic units a Red submarine is
able to take under attack, the accuracy of its attacks, and
the effectiveness of its weapons.
EXPECTED RED LOSSES . Based on the assumptions associated with
equation (2) , we can express the total number of expected Red
losses , DR, as
:
DR = mPS. + (M - nDPS^ (3)
12
where PS = the probability a Red submarine in A is destroyed
by a Blue attacking unit, and
PS = the probability a Red submarine in A is destroyed
by a Blue attacking unit.
Since P is the probability a Red unit survives,
PS, = 1 - P. . Similarly, PS = 1 - P .
1 i •* ' c c
DETERMINATION OF PROBABILITIES . To determine the probabil-
ities of kill it is necessary to define another area. The
Blue .attacking units are deployed in an area which is called
the area of search, AS. The area of search has the convoy as
its center at all times and is made up of two parts. The
first is an area denoted AS- which is partially congruent
with the area of interest. The second, AS , is partially
congruent with the area of concern.
The formation or composition of the logistic convoy may
be thought of geometrically as a square, and the total area
of search, AS = AS + AS , may then be considered to be a
square with dimensions J by J, where J/2 is the maximum range
of the Red missiles . For symmetry, the area AS has dimen-
sions L by J and the area AS. has dimensions L. by J. Thus
c 2 1 i 2
J = L. + L where L. and L are measured perpendicular to the
1 c 1 C f c
convoy's track (see figure 1).
It should be noted that as the convoy transits, AS will
sweep out the area of interest, A,, and AS will sweep out
the area of concern, A .
c
The time, T, for the convoy to travel the distance J at






















where AS. = the area assigned to each Blue attacking unit in
AS. ;l
n = the number of Blue attacking units in AS .
.
Similarly in the area of concern:
A AS„
AS_ =
c N - n
where AS = the area assigned to each Blue attacking unit in
AS. ;l
N = the total number of Blue attacking units available;
N - n = the number of Blue attacking units in AS .
^ c
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The probability, PS, that a Red submarine is killed in
any area, given it is present, is expressed by
PS = P P.P,
,w 1 d '
where P = the probability a weapon launched by Blue is
effective, given a weapon is launched;
P. = the probability that a Blue attacking unit gets
into an attack position and launches a weapon,
given that a Red submarine is detected by a
Blue attacking unit;
P, = the probability a Red submarine is detected by
a Blue attacking unit, given the submarine is
in the area being searched.
Using the "formula for random search" as the probability
of detection, P., the probability a Red submarine is killed









where w - the relative speed of the Blue attacking unit and
Red submarine;
W = the effective sweep width of the Blue attacking
unit in either A or A .
1 c
Both w and W are assumed to be constant over the duration of
the convoy's oceanic crossing.
Upon substitution for T and AS in equation (4) , the
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Since w, W. , J, S, and AS are constant parameters of
wW J
the model, we set k . = —r- , where k represents Blue's
detection constant in the area of interest. In a like
manner, since (P ) and (P, ) are constant parameters we set
w . 1 . ^
1 1
K = (P ) (P )
i w . 1
.
, where K , is a measure of Blue's attacking
performance in the area of interest.
Similarly, we will denote k as Blue's detection con-
stant in the area of concern and K as a measure of Blue's
c
attacking performance in the area of concern.








PS^ = K [1-exp-k (N-n) ] . (7)
EXPLICIT FORM OF THE PAYOFF FUNCTION . Substitution of equa-
tions (6) and (7) in equations (2) and (3) gives the explicit
forms of the expected Blue and Red losses. These forms, upon
substitution into equation (1) , result in the following ex-
pression for the Blue commander's payoff function:
D(m,n)=mC. [1-K. (1-exp-k. n) ] + (M-m)C (l-K [1-exp-k (N-n)])1 F 1 c ^ c c *
- u(mK. (1-exp-k. n) + (M-m)K [1-exp-k (N-n)]). (8)
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III. CRITERION OF THE MODEL
In analyzing this military conflict situation as a game
of strategy, a player's skill and intelligence should be used
to determine the payoff. The formulation of the model was
intended to structure Blue's allocation problem as a two-
person, finite, zero-sum, non-cooperative game.
It is two-person since there are only two opponents,
Blue and Red. Since each player's resources are discrete
units and have an upper limit, both have a finite number of
possible alternative allocations. The game is therefore fi-
nite. The game is non-cooperative because neither side com-
municates with the other.
Consideration of Blue's allocation problem in the zero-
sum sense means that whatever Blue does not win (i.e., Blue
losses and Red survivals) will be considered to be a gain for
Red and Red's gain is measured by Blue on the same scale as
he measures his own payoff. It follows then that the sum of
Blue's and Red's payoff determined in this manner will be
zero.
A finite two-person, zero-sum game in which both oppo-
nents play simultaneously without information about the
other's action is called a rectangular or matrix game. For
such games, a payoff matrix or array of the payoffs to either
player resulting from all combinations of the players' strat-
egies can be constructed. If M and N are the total number of
available Red and Blue attacking units, respectively, then a
payoff matrix, D, can be constructed such that the number of
the rows and the number of the columns is equal to the number
17
of possible units that Red and Blue could respectively deploy
into the area of interest. This completely describes all
possible outcomes since units not allocated in the area of
interest are allocated to the area of concern. An element
of D, denoted d.
.
, represents the expected outcome for a
crossing in which Red uses i attacking units and Blue uses j
units in the area of interest. Thus D is a M by N matrix
with elements d.. such that i = 1,2,...,M and j = 1,2,...,N.
In solving for his optimal strategy in a matrix game,
Blue will apply the minimax criterion. Under this criterion
Blue makes use of the following three presuppositions.
First, Blue feels that Red's motives are diametrically
opposed to his own. Blue is trying to get the convoy across
the ocean and Red is trying to prevent this deed.
Second, Blue realizes Red could very closely approximate
Blue's payoff matrix and determine Blue's optimal strategy.
Third, Blue feels that if Red knew Blue's allocation
then Red would allocate his forces to reduce Blue's payoff
as much as possible. These three presuppositions indicate
that Blue considers Red a rational and intelligent opponent.
With these factors as his decision basis, Blue begins
his selection of his optimal strategy for allocation of forces
between the areas of interest and concern by investigating
the worst that could happen (i.e., the largest value of D)
for each of his possible alternatives. He then takes the
alternative corresponding to the minimum of these as his
optimal strategy. This is the well known minimax strategy
18
of game theory- Although it is pessimistic in nature, the
use of this criterion provides an upper bound on the worst
that could happen to Blue.
For any finite two-person, zero-sum game each player's
optimal strategy is either a pure strategy or a mixed strat-
egy. A pure strategy for Blue in our problem implies that
Blue always uses the same allocation between the areas for
the same given set of parameters of the model. A mixed strat-
egy under these same conditions implies choosing an allocation
prior to each crossing in accordance with some particular
probability distribution. We will show that only strategies
which are pure strategies will be optimal for this allocation
problem.
19
IV. BLUE'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT . In the determination of Blue's optimal strategy
we will initially ignore the integer requirement on the number
of Blue and Red forces allocated to any area.
If Blue plays some strategy n then the worst that can
happen to him is that D(m,n) will take on a value of
max D(m / n). Therefore, under the minimax criterion Blue
0<m<M
selects n yielding min max D(m,n) = v, . In a like manner,
0<n<N 0<m<M
Red would select m in order to max min D(m,n) = v~
.
<m£M 0_<n<N
The payoff function is now examined in the light of the
following saddle point theorem [6]:
Theorem: "Let f be a real-valued function such
that f (x,y) is defined whenever xGA and y€B
(A and B are sets) ; then a point, (x ,y ) , such
that x 6A and y GB is called a saddle point of
o o
f if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) f(x,yQ ) < f(xQ ,yo ) for all x€A
(ii) f(xQ ,yo ) < f(xQ ,y) for all y6B.
Then a necessary and sufficient condition that
max min f(x,y) = min max f(x,y) = f (x ,y )
xGA ySB ySB xGA °
is that f possesses a saddle point."
Therefore, for our problem, if v, and v~ exist and are
equal then the optimal solution to the game is the set of pure
strategies (mQ ,n Q ). To prove that they exist and are equal it
must be shown that a saddle point exists at (m ,n Q ) such that
the following relation holds:
D(m,n
Q ) _<
D(m ,n ) _< D(mQ ,n) .
20
Inspection of equation (8) shows that D is continuous in
both m and n for -» : m •: « and -°° n ' °°. Closer inspec-
tion shows that D is convex in n for any given m and linear
in m for any given n. These properties suggest that a saddle
point (mQ/ n ) may be obtained by taking the partial deriv-
atives of D with respect to both m and n, setting both par-
tials equal to zero, and solving for the values of m and n
which satisfy the resulting system of equations.
The partial derivatives are
p. n -k.n -k (N-n)
55












~ = - mK.k. (C.+U)e + (M-m)K k (C +U)
e
When these derivatives are set equal to zero, we get
-k.n
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Equations (9) and (10) form a system of two equations
with two unknowns. Since (9) is a function of n only, it can
be solved for the value of n » Tnis value of nQ can then be
substituted in Q0) to determine rtu
Since D is strictly convex in n for any given m, it
follows that D(m ,n Q ) £ D(m ,n) for all -« _< n <_ «. Further,
since D is linear in m for any given n, it follows that
'0D(m,n Q ) = D(m ,n Q ) for all -« £ m £ °° because n n was selected
21
3D
to give j— = 0, Thus (mQ/ n ) obtained from equations (9)
and (10) is a saddle point.
We will designate m* and n* as the optimal strategies
for Red and Blue; as such they must satisfy tne requirements
of <_ m* M and <_ n* <^ N. If m
fi
and n Q fall within the
feasibility region of m* and n* then it follows from the
saddle point theorem that m •= m* and n
n
=* n*. We will refer
to any pair of optimal strategies corresponding to this sit-
uation as an Internal-Saddle-point (ISP) solution.
A special property of ISP solutions is that < m* < M.
This property is a consequence of equation (10) . We can re-



















The term in brackets of this expression is positive and
greater than unity for -a < n Q < °°; therefore < mQ < M.
It follows that < m* < M whenever n Q <_ N.
A further consequence of the special property is that
the following cases will never occur :






It is clear that the saddle-point solution will not
necessarily provide integer values for m* and n* due to our
relaxing of the integer requirement. To obtain the "best"
integer solution we will evaluate the payoff function for
the four integer solutions closest to m* and n* and choose
22
that integer solution having its D value closest to D (m* , n*)
,
We will refer to this integer solution as the pseudo-saddle-
point. We recognize the theoretical difficulties in round-
ing off non-integer solutions to obtain integer values, but
we feel that the approach is reasonable for a practical prob-
lem, particularly one whose parameters are somewhat inexact.
This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
Suppose now that n
fl
lies outside the interval [0,N].
What will the optimal strategies be? In answering this ques-
tion we will consider two cases; the first (Case I) corres-
ponds to n Q < and the second (Case II) to n n > N.
To facilitate the study of these cases, the expressions
for D when m = and m = M are useful. They are
D(0,n) = M
-k (N-n)






D(M,n) = M C. K. (C.+U) (1-e 1 )
|_ l i l
(11)
(12)
Inspection of equation (8) shows that D(m,n) can be written
as the following convex combination of D(0,n) and D(M,n):
D(m,n) - XD(M,n) + (1-X) D(0,n)
where X = — - Obviously X 1 if m is required to lie in
the region : m ' M„ Figure 2 is a sketch of equations (11)
and (12) as a function of n. This figure shows an ISP solu-
tion (i.e., m* = m
fi
and n* - n Q ) . The value of n where the
curves for D(0,n) and D(M,n) intersect is n Q because the
bracketed terms of (11) and (12) are, in fact, the right and




















From figure 2 it is easy to see that Case I (n Q < 0)
will occur when D(0,n) > D(M,N) for On N s The optimal
strategies in this case must then be n* = and m* = since
D(m / 0) < D(0,0) < D(0,n) for any : n <_ N and any : m £ M,
Case II (n Q > N) will occur when D(0,n) < D(M,n) for
On N. The optimal strategy in this case is then m* = M
and n* = N since D(m,N) < D(M,N) < D(M,n) for any n
_< N
and any
_< m : M.
From these observations and the derivation of equation










In addition, it is worthwhile to observe that
3m"
K
° when n < n ;
|| > when n > n Q .





when n, < n 2 «
n-n.l
2 " "1
These results suggest a procedure for determining the optimal
strategy cases (Case I, Case II, or ISP) on the basis of the
values of the parameters of a particular problem. The devel-
opment of this procedure is based on the following lemmas and
theorems
,
Lemma 1 : The necessary and sufficient condition for Case
I (n A < 0) to occur is t— < 0./ 3m -.
' n=0
Proof: Assume n Q < 0. Since n Q is defined as the value
of n giving *— =0 and r- is a strictly monotonic decreasing3 3 dm dm
function of n, it follows that *— < for n = 0.3m
Next, assume •=-—
' 3m
< 0. Prom the definition of n~ we
n-0
know 7T—\ - 0, From the monotonicity of tt— it then follows3m J 3m
n=n
that nQ < 0«





~\ = C. - C + K (C +U) (1-e ) ,dm|
n-0 X C C
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and tt— < is equivalent todm n ^n=0
-k N
C.+K U(l-e ° ) A -
C > —: = C (13)




Therefore, as a consequence of Lemma 1, we can state the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 ; The optimal strategies are (m* , n*) = (0,0)
/*.
if and only if C > C .2 c c




Lemma 2 : The necessary and sufficient condition for
> 0.
\ n
Case II (n~ > N) to occur is *—dm
dm
n=N
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. In tnis case,
> is equivalent to
n=N
-k.N
C < C. - K.(C.+U)(l-e X ) = C . (14)
c 1 11 c
And, as a consequence of Lemma 2, we can state the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 ; The optimal strategies are (m*,n*) = (M,N)
if and only if C < CJ c c






we have the following corollary.
Corollary ; The optimal strategies are (m*,n*) = (m ,n Q )
if and only if C < C < C .J c — c — c
From the theorems and the corollary we realize that the
necessary and sufficient conditions for each case can be de-
termined by an investigation of the relationship of C to
26
C and C . To solve a given problem for the optimal strat-
egies, we would first calculate the values of C and C and
c c
compare the value of C with these calculated values. If
either Case I or II results then the optimal strategies are
easily specified. If the ISP Case arises then the optimal
strategies must be determined using equations (9) and (10)
.
The following numerical example illustrates this procedure.
EXAMPLE . Suppose the following parameters are given:
C = C. = 1-0 U = K , K. = k, - 0.5, k = 0.0405, andC 1 C 1 1 c
M = N = 10.
From equations (13) and (14) we get C = 2.0 and C =0.67
Because C = 1,0 we have C C C and, from the corollary,
an ISP solution is optimal. Using equations (9) and (10) we
calculate the saddle-point solutions to be m = 3.54 and
n
fi




are well within their re-
spective feasible ranges, the optimal non-integer strategies
are m* = 3.54, n* = 1.7 8 and D(3.54, 1.78) = 4.37. However,
only integer values of m and n are permissible, thus the pay-
off function, D(m,n), must be evaluated for the four integer
solutions closest to m* and n* to determine the pseudo-
saddle-point solution. These four values are: D(3,l) = 4.50,
D(3,2) - 4.22, D(4.1) = 4.76, D(4,2) = 4.16. Since we should
choose that integer solution closest to the non-integer
saddle-point solution, we pick D equal to 4.50. This pseudo-
saddle-point solution yields integer strategies of m = 3 and
n = L
The relationship between m* and n* for ISP solutions to




shows the various optimal strategy regions and constant value
curves of m* and n* plotted on the C - k. plane for values
of the other parameters of our sample problem. Although it
may not be evident from this figure, it should be noted that
as k. increases the constant m lines asymptotically approach
the value of C . The C line corresponds also to the n =
curve and thus for very large values of k. all solutions will
be Case I (m* = 0, n* = 0).
From figure 3 it may be seen that an increase of k.,
with all other parameters fixed results in a decrease of n*
and an initial decrease then increase of m*. This seems rea-
sonable since as Blue's detection constant in the area of
interest increases, it forces Red to maintain more of his
effort in the area of concern, where he is not as vulnerable
to detection, and thus Blue is forced to direct his attention
to the area of concern. However, as Blue increases his effort
in the area of concern Red will desire to shift more of his
units to the area of interest.
An increase of C , with all other parameters fixed, re-
c
suits in a decrease of m* and n* . This implies the subma-
rines' effectiveness in the area of concern has increased and
as such Red would want to allocate more to this area. Sup-
posedly Blue's estimate of C would increase also and thus he
would allocate more ASW units to the area of concern. Hence
both m* and n* decrease since both sides are re-allocating
their units to the area of concern.
Associated with any particular set of m* , n* within the
region of ISP solutions will be either one or two different
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sets of C , k. values. Each case having only a single set
of C , k. values occurs where a constant ra line is tangent
to a constant n > line or where a constant m line intersects
with the n = line.
As we have shown, the optimal strategies can be calcu-
lated if the values of all the parameters are known. In re-
ality, these values will probably be the result of the Blue
commander's judgment because it would be difficult, for ex-
ample, for him to know precisely the submarines' effectiveness
with surfaced-launched missiles. The value of U, in partic-
ular, is completely subjective. Consequently, an awareness
of the influences of the various parameters is important.
An understanding of the parametric influences may be
facilitated by consideration of the optimal strategy in the
C - k. plane. Figure 4 illustrates the shape of these
regions for parameter values of our example. A large amount
of information about the influences of the various parameters
can be obtained by a study of the behavior of C and C in
this plane. For example, if U were to be increased from 1.0
to 2.0, then C would increase and C would decrease as in-
c c
dicated by the dashed curves in figure 4. Thus, the ISP
solution area of the C - k. plane increases. Conversely,
as U decreases this area decreases.
The changes in C , C , and D per unit change of any of
the parameters of the model can also be obtained by taking
partial derivatives with respect to the particular parameter





(m*,n*) = (m0/ n )
1.0 l
Figure 4
An analysis of the effects of changing the various param-
eters would indicate how best a planner might change his op-
timal strategy if the opportunity arises. In a sense it gives
a planner a limited option of regulating the outcome of the
payoff function if he has knowledge of and control of some of
the input parameters. For example, a planner may have the
ability to direct more effort or funds into one or more param-
eters which he is able to adjust. Through an examination of
the model he could determine how best to change his control-
lable parameters in order to realize the most benefit. As
another example, a planner may be able to obtain sufficiently
reasonable estimates of the input parameters so that a
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"ball-park" optimal solution can be determined. He could then
determine from a sensitivity analysis which parameters merit
further study to obtain more precise estimates.
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V. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
ASSUMPTIONS . We have greatly simplified the model by assuming
both that the area of interest is like a "road" across the
ocean with the area of concern laying on either side and that
the areas assigned to the ASW units to search coincide with
the areas of interest and concern. What has been ignored here
is, first, the kinematics of search theory imposed by the
capabilities of the units of both sides, and second, the pos-
sibility that the convoy could be attacked with missiles from
the front and rear. This limits the application of the model
but not the use of a game theoretic approach in the analysis.
We have assumed that both Blue and Red know the location
and size of the areas of interest and concern. Red knows the
size of the areas since both areas are a function of the
capabilities of Red's weapons. Blue knows the location of
the convoy route since he chooses it. Blue can usually ap-
proximate the effective range of Red's weapons and will use
these estimates to assign his ASW units. Thus, we can say
that Blue fairly well knows the size of both the area of in-
terest and the area of concern. We have assumed that Red
knows the location of the" convoy route since this would prob-
ably lead to the worst possible outcome of a crossing as far
as Blue is concerned, and this assumption is thus consistent
with the pessimistic attitude of a player using the minimax
criterion.
Use of the "formula for random search" for the probabil-
ity of a Blue unit detecting a Red unit that is present is
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valid when both Blue and Red are moving independently and
randomly. Even though the "formula" is by nature pessimistic,
its use is consistent with the minimax criterion. The as-
sumption of Blue attacking units moving independently and
randomly is justified when a Blue attacking unit is individ-
ually assigned an area to search. This usually occurs when
they are either limited in number available, detached from
the immediate area of the convoy to search in some large re-
mote area, or dispersed because of the threat of a nuclear
attack. The assumption may not be justified if the ASW mis-
sion is conducted under coordinated, systematic, multi-
vehicle search plans. This type of search may occur when
the available number of both ships and aircraft are limited.
Such search plans negate both the assumption of each Blue unit
searching equal areas , and the assumption of homogenity of
the Blue attacking force.
The assumption of an independent, random, uniform deploy-
ment of Red submarines is quite reasonable because any mutual
interference that one submarine may have on another is
avoided.
The assumption that a Blue attacking unit always has an
opportunity to detect and attack a Red unit before the Red
unit attacks is a matter of conjecture. In many regards this
assumption is reasonable because the submarine must usually
commit some act that will increase his likelihood of detection
(i.e., expose his periscope when making a torpedo attack or
surfacing while conducting a missile attack)
.
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Although the primary mission of the Red submarines is
the destruction of the convoy logistic units, it is quite
possible that they may attack the escort vehicles. For ex-
ample, if an ASW aircraft carrier is involved with the convoy
most submarine commanding officers would prefer to sink the
carrier before they begin to sink the logistic units. The
destruction of a carrier obviously removes a major threat to
the Red forces.
Some of the parameters which we have assumed to be con-
stant in the model may in fact be quite variable. For ex-
ample, when we formulated the detection constant in an area,
we treated the relative speed between the Red and Blue units
to be a constant given value determined exogenous to the
model. The assumption of fixed relative speed between Blue
and Red units is reasonable when there is a large speed dif-
ferential between Red and Blue units such as when Blue uses
ASW aircraft units against Red submarines. The assumption,
however, is generally questionable. When ships are used as
Blue attacking units they will generally operate at low speeds
in order to enhance their sonar detection capabilities. The
behavior of these ships and the Red submarines, operating at
various speeds either to avoid detection or to establish an
accurate firing position, would result in a highly variable
relative speed- Also, if nuclear submarines are employed by
Red, the relative speed is probably not constant regardless
of the type vehicle used by Blue since the speeds of the
nuclear submarines can vary over a wide range.
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In summary/ although the validity of some of the assump-
tions may be debatable, the assumptions are realistic enough
to permit the model to be useful as a first approximation to
the study of a convoy crossing in a submarine environment.
PAYOFF FUNCTION AND ALTERNATIVES . In this study the goal of
the Blue commander has been to minimize the payoff function,
D = DB - U (DR) . It has been pointed out that this payoff
function implies that Blue receives both a short-run and a
long-run return. It should be noted that if long-run returns
are considered, then this implies that the Blue commander
would be willing to risk an increase in logistic losses to
gain a larger increase in submarine losses. The amount of
risk the Blue commander is willing to take is represented by
the value of U. If the value of U is small this implies he
is willing to take only a small risk in the increase of logis-
tic losses. Conversely if U is large he is willing to take a
high risk.
If the Blue commander had other objectives then an alter-
native payoff function might be appropriate. For instance, if
circumstances prevail which dictate a one-convoy-only situa-
tion then the influence of the long-run benefits received by
sinking a submarine would be ignored because the Blue command-
er's primary interest would be to prevent the submarines from
attacking the logistic units. The objective of the Blue com-
mander in this case would be to minimize only Blue losses.
This implies that Blue does not have to destroy the submarines
but only prevent them from attacking to assure the successful
crossing of the logistic units. A contingency such as this
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will exist when the value of the cargo of the logistic units
is of exceptionally high value (such as that of a country's
total amphibious assault force) . It should be emphasized
that using this payoff function in a multiple convoy situation
could very well lead to suboptimization.
If the size of the enemy's entire submarine force and
other pertinent information, such as resupply rate, are known
then a Lanchester approach might prove very interesting [8]
.
In this case the payoff function would be a relationship
DB
using the exchange ratio, =-5-. The user* however, should beUK
forewarned of the usual criticism of a ratio type of objec-
tive function; it is easy to lose sight of the magnitude of
the losses.
USE OF GAME THEORY , According to game theory, instead of
using the pseudo-saddle-point solution when a non-integer ISP
occurs, we should use a mixed strategy. From the nature of
the payoff function Blue's mixed strategy will assign positive
probability to some set of the min (M,N) alternatives. The
use of the pseudo-saddle-point solution, however, offers a
more realistic approach to this convoy allocation problem.
This can be seen for several reasons.
Since the Blue commander is faced with a single decision
that determines the allocation strategy for the complete cros-
sing, it seems reasonable that when the non-integer ISP case
occurs he would choose a strategy near the saddle-point.
Clearly, the pseudo-saddle-point solution is appealing
when there are a large number of units to allocate since the
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round-off procedure would imply only a small percentage
change from the non-integer outcome.
Further, the uncertainty of the Blue commander's esti-
mates of the values of the parameters of the model suggests
a variation in the location of the true saddle-point. One
might be able, for example, to make some confidence state-
ments about a calculated value of the saddle-point based on
the distribution associated with some parameter. As such,
the round-off procedure will possibly keep the allocation
strategy within the location of the true saddle-point. The
variability of the parameter estimates also allows the pseudo-
saddle-point to be used when a small number of units is to be
allocated.
Because game theory has been used in this study to
analyze the convoy system allocation, it is necessary to
realize that there are limitations or restrictions that are
inherent in a game theoretic approach to actual conflict
situations. As Quade points out [9]:
"Game theory does not cover all the diverse
factors which enter into behavior in the face of
a conflict of interest. There are certain impor-
tant limitations. First, the theory assumes that
all the possible outcomes can be specified and
that each participant is able to assign to each a
measure of preference, or utility, so that the one
with a larger numerical utility is preferred to
one with a smaller utility. Second, all the var-
iables which determine the payoff and the values
of the payoff can be specified; that is, a de-
tailed description of all possible actions is
required.
"
To what extent can we satisfy these limitations in our
problem? First, all possible outcomes can be determined in
our problem if the upper bound on the number of forces on
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each side is known or can be estimated with a high degree of
confidence. The assumption that this parameter will be spec-
ified is very reasonable since a credible estimate of force
size is usually available. Second, the payoff matrix in the
convoy allocation problem is a function of losses and surviv-
als and, hence, is readily adaptable to some measure of pref-
erence. Finally, even though knowledge of all actual param-
eters or variables in a complex problem is quite impossible,
a reasonable estimate of the major or more significant param-
eters in such a problem is conceivable.
Whether a game theoretic approach can be used for deter-
mining an actual strategy in war or only for planning purposes
appears to be dependent on the accurate description of all the
necessary parameters and the degree of confidence in the esti-
mate of their values, The convoy allocation model attempts
to include those parameters which represent all the major as-
pects of the situation. However, both a more detailed model
and a more precise investigation into the assumptions would
undoubtedly be required in the determination of actual wartime
strategies. Nonetheless, the model formulated in this study
appears useful for planning or policy analysis. A planner
can not only use the model to understand the general nature
of the problem but also to investigate the influence of
changes in parameter values. Both can be valuable when future
models of the convoy allocation problem are considered.
Because of the structure of the payoff matrix and the
nature of the payoff function required by the first and second
limitation respectively, the game theoretic approach provides
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a systematic analysis of both the alternative courses of
action and tne effects of changes in parameters.
Even tnough the game is one in which Blue and Red are
assumed to be diametrically opposed, it is possible that they
will not have precisely opposite objectives. This may be
taken into account by permitting each player to assign a dif-
ferent value to the weighting factor, U, which compares the
value of a Blue logistic unit to a Red submarine. Thus, even
though a matrix of outcomes in terms of absolute losses is
the same for both sides, each player would generate his own
payoff matrix and use it to determine his optimal allocation
strategy. The zero-sum problem would occur only if both
players use the same value for U f The general problem is un-
doubtedly a nonzero-sum game.
From a philosophical point of view, we have only deter-
mined Blue's optimal strategy- The Red strategy derived cor-
responding to Blue's optimal strategy is the strategy that
Blue contends is optimal for Red to use. This is the strategy
that Blue will assume that Red will actually employ when Blue
plans his courses of action. However, this is clearly not
Red's optimal allocation strategy if two different payoff ma-
trices exist.
What guarantee is there that analyzing Blue's payoff ma-
trix in the context of a zero-sum game and using tne minimax
criterion will give acceptable results to a decision maker?
Suppose that internal saddle point solutions are obtained
from both players' matrices and further that the two solu-
tions are not identical. Clearly, if both sides use their
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optimal strategies with respect to their own payoff matrix
they may be playing non-optimal strategies with respect to
their opponent's payoff matrix. However, if each side plays
his own minimax strategy then neither can receive a worse pay-
off as far as they are each concerned. Thus, tne minimax
solution of a player's own payoff matrix in our problem pro-
vides Blue and Red with upper and lower estimates, respec-
tively, of the payoff they will receive in the combined
problem. Each side would play these strategies if they had
no information about their opponent's value of U.
If a player can accurately determine nis opponent's pay-
off matrix then he may want to use a different strategy than
the one based on his own payoff matrix. Suppose Blue knows
not only Red's payoff matrix but also that Red uses the maxi-
min criterion to determine his optimal strategy. The best
course of action for Blue to take after evaluating Red's pay-
off matrix is to play that strategy which minimizes his own
payoff when Red uses his maximin optimal strategy. In this
case Blue's payoff would be at least as large as that for the
minimax solution. Thus, a purpose or need for a continuous
and persistent effort to obtain reliable intelligence of an
enemy's intentions or knowledge of his actions is quite
apparent.
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VI. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL AND FURTHER STUDIES
The use of the pseudo-saddle-point solution needs further
justification because the theoretical optimal solution for
integer-valued strategies to the saddle-point payoff matrix
indicates mixed strategies are best. The probability density
function associated with the mixed strategies should be in-
vestigated to determine if it is unimodal in the vicinity of
the saddle-point and if it has a small variance. It seems
that this might be the case when the payoff function is reas-
onably flat in the region of the saddle-point as occurred in
our sample problem. Such a study would indicate the validity
of the round-off procedure.
A worthwhile study would be the investigation of the
case where the Blue attacking units and Red units are not as-
sumed to be homogeneous in effectiveness. For example, Blue
could be allowed to use destroyers, aircraft, and submarines
simultaneously as attacking units and Red could have several
different types of submarines with different capabilities.
If submarines are used as Blue attacking units, they would
probably be deployed independently of one another in an area
beyond the area of search of the aircraft and destroyers.
Their purpose would be to provide a loose barrier patrol ori-
ented towards the general direction of the expected Red threat
Whereas our model presupposes the deployment of Red prior to
the convoy transit, the use of a Blue submarine barrier would
require a change in the model to allow for attrition of the
Red threat as it approaches the region of the convoy's
anticipated track.
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The effect of allowing Blue attacking units to be vul-
nerable to the Red submarines should be studied. This is
particularly important because ASW carriers are oftem em-
ployed by Blue. By the very nature of the target a submarine
commanding officer would take delight in the sinking of a
carrier!
An interesting extension would be the study of the effect
of relaxing the assumption that the deployment of the Blue
attacking units as independent units in equal, non-overlapping
areas. One approach might be to require coordinated, system-
atic search and attack plans which correspond more to actual
naval operations. The use of systematic plans, which are
usually based on acceptable assumptions, generally increases
the probability of detection since they utilize current
available data from the environment and other sources. How-
ever, it is important to note that systematic search plans
will rule out the use of the "formula of random search".
This "formula" gave the mathematical property of convexity
to the payoff function and hence greatly facilitated the op-
timization of this model.
It might be beneficial to point out that time is present
in the model in a limited manner since detection is usually
a function of time- Yet, the model is still static in nature
since the optimal strategies are derived for the complete
crossing. A better model would be one that permits several
changes in optimal strategies as the convoy crosses. After
a certain time, possibly measured in number of engagements
with Red units, the model would be updated to conform with a
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task-force commander's actions. A dynamic programming
formulation might be appropriate for such a model. This
model could also be applied to the problem of several sequen-
tial convoys.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A game theoretic approach has been applied to an oceanic
convoy situation in an enemy submarine environment. Provid-
ing tne capabilities and limitations of both opponents can
be specified, a procedure for determining the optimum alloca-
tion of both forces has been presented. The method is de-
pendent upon the planner's ability to estimate the detection
and kill effectiveness parameters of both opponents. The use
of the minimax criterion, while providing a pessimistic out-
look, does assure an upper bound on the worst that could
happen to either side.
To the authors ' knowledge this is the first study of an
oceanic convoy crossing which utilizes game theory as an
analytical technique. The results of the study have shown
that a game theoretic approach provides both opponents with
a flexible model from which a systematic solution to the allo-
cation problem can be obtained. More significantly, it re-
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